The appropriate response of Spanish Gitanos: short-run orientation beyond current socio-economic status by Martín, Jesús et al.
Middlesex University Research Repository
An open access repository of
Middlesex University research
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk
Martín, Jesús, Branas-Garza, Pablo, Espín, Antonio M., Gamella, Juan F. and Herrmann,
Benedikt (2019) The appropriate response of Spanish Gitanos: short-run orientation beyond
current socio-economic status. Evolution and Human Behavior, 40 (1). pp. 12-22. ISSN
1090-5138
Final accepted version (with author’s formatting)
This version is available at: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/24722/
Copyright:
Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University’s research available electronically.
Copyright and moral rights to this work are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners
unless otherwise stated. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for commercial gain
is strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, non-commercial, research or study
without prior permission and without charge.
Works, including theses and research projects, may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or
extensive quotations taken from them, or their content changed in any way, without first obtaining
permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). They may not be sold or exploited commercially in
any format or medium without the prior written permission of the copyright holder(s).
Full bibliographic details must be given when referring to, or quoting from full items including the
author’s name, the title of the work, publication details where relevant (place, publisher, date), pag-
ination, and for theses or dissertations the awarding institution, the degree type awarded, and the
date of the award.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact the
Repository Team at Middlesex University via the following email address:
eprints@mdx.ac.uk
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated.
See also repository copyright: re-use policy: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/policies.html#copy
The appropriate response of Spanish Gitanos: Short-run 
orientation beyond current socio-economic status 
Jesús Martín1, Pablo Brañas-Garza2*, Antonio M. Espín2,3, Juan F. Gamella1 & Benedikt 
Herrmann4 
Authors’ affiliation 
1. Universidad de Granada, Campus de Cartuja S/N, 18071 Granada, Spain. 
2. Loyola Behavioral Lab, Universidad Loyola Andalucia, 14003 Cordoba, Spain 
3. Middlesex University London, Hendon Campus, The Burroughs, London NW4 4BT, 
United Kingdom. 
4. University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom. 
*Corresponding author. E-mail: branasgarza@gmail.com 
 
Author´s Contributions 
JM performed the statistical analyses and wrote the paper; PBG designed and conducted the 
experiment and wrote the paper; AME designed and conducted the experiment, performed 
the statistical analyses and wrote the paper; JFG designed and conducted the experiment and 
wrote the paper; BH designed the experiment and wrote the paper.   
 
Declaration of interest statement 
The authors declare no conflict of interest. 
 
Funding 
Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2013-44879-
R) and the Regional Government of Andalusia (P11- SEJ-8286) and (P12-SEJ-1436) is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
 Acknowledgements 
We thank T. E. Dickins, W. Frankenhuis, the Editor-in-charge and one anonymous referee 
for their helpful and brilliant comments, and J. A. Abril, A. Cortés, J. Martín, E. M. Muñoz, 
L. A. Palacios, M. Parravano, L. E. Pedauga, A. Quesada, M. Román and J. F. Ruano for 
their research assistance. Special thanks are due to the authorities and inhabitants of Benalúa, 
Darro, Deifontes, Iznalloz and Pedro Martínez.  
 
[THIS MANUSCRIPT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AT EVOLUTION AND HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR. THIS VERSION IS WITH AUTHOR’S FORMATTING. PLEASE REFER TO 
THE PUBLISHED VERSION] 
 
  
Abstract 
Humans differ greatly in their tendency to discount future events, but the reasons underlying 
such inter-individual differences remain poorly understood. Based on the evolutionary 
framework of Life History Theory, influential models predict that the extent to which 
individuals discount the future should be influenced by socio-ecological factors such as 
mortality risk, environmental predictability and resource scarcity. However, little empirical 
work has been conducted to compare the discounting behavior of human groups facing 
different socio-ecological conditions. In a lab-in-the-field economic experiment, we 
compared the delay discounting of a sample of Romani people from Southern Spain 
(Gitanos) with that of their non-Romani neighbors (i.e., the majority Spanish population). 
The Romani-Gitano population constitutes the main ethnic minority in all of Europe today 
and is characterized by lower socio-economic status (SES), lower life expectancy and poorer 
health than the majority, along with a historical experience of discrimination and persecution. 
According to those Life History Theory models, Gitanos will tend to adopt “faster” life 
history strategies (e.g., earlier marriage and reproduction) as an adaptation to such ecological 
conditions and, therefore, should discount the future more heavily than the majority. Our 
results support this prediction, even after controlling for the individuals’ current SES (income 
and education). Moreover, group-level differences explain a large share of the individual-
level differences. Our data suggest that human inter-group discrimination might shape group 
members’ time preferences through its impact on the environmental harshness and 
unpredictability conditions they face. 
Keywords: Romani, delay discounting, impatience, adaptation, evolutionary psychology, 
life history   
1. Introduction. 
In nature, individuals of different species often have to choose between outcomes realized at 
different times (Ainslie, 1975; Rachlin & Green, 1972). These inter-temporal choices are also 
ubiquitous in the lives of humans, for instance, in the spheres of marriage and reproduction, 
education and work, as well as during social and market interactions (Espín et al., 2012, 2015; 
Frederick et al., 2002; Nettle et al., 2011; Woodburn, 1980). When faced with such decisions, 
individuals tend to discount the value of delayed rewards. The preference for sooner-smaller 
rewards over later-larger rewards has been referred to as delay discounting (DD) (Frederick 
et al., 2002; Kirby et al. 2002). DD is considered to be a measure of one of the multiple 
domains of impulsivity, namely “impulsive choice” (Bevilacqua & Goldman, 2013; 
Reynolds et al., 2006). 
DD tends to be a stable individual characteristic (Ohmura et al., 2006; Kirby, 2009) – 
although it may be momentarily influenced by short-term state manipulations (e.g., Kidd et 
al., 2013; Read & van Leeuwen, 1998) – and people differ greatly in the extent to which they 
discount the future (Frederick et al., 2002). However, the factors underlying such inter-
individual differences remain poorly understood. On the one hand, there is evidence 
suggesting that DD rates are heritable to some extent (Anokhin et al., 2011, 2015; Aycinena 
& Rentschler, 2017; Bevilacqua & Goldman, 2013). On the other hand, people’s current 
socio-economic conditions, as proxied by variables such as education and income, also seem 
to be related to DD: poorer and less educated individuals have been found to discount the 
future more heavily (Harrison et al., 2002; Kirby et al. 2002; Tanaka et al., 2010), although 
the causal direction is unclear (Becker & Mulligan, 1997). In addition, a number of 
behavioral disorders (e.g., attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, aggression, suicide, and 
substance abuse) have been associated with high DD (Barkley et al., 2001; Bickel, & Marsch, 
2001; Dombrovski et al., 2011).  
The latter evidence has been taken to support the notion of high DD as a maladaptive trait. 
However, under certain socio-ecological conditions, discounting the future can be a 
contextually appropriate response. To be more specific, developing a preference for the short-
run may be fitness-maximizing in harsh and unpredictable environments (Becker & 
Mulligan, 1997; Daly & Wilson, 2005; Frankenhuis et al., 2016; Hill et al., 2008; Pepper, & 
Nettle, 2017).  
According to Life History Theory (Del Giudice et al., 2015; Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005; 
Roff, 1993), variation in life history traits (e.g., size and number of offspring, parental 
investment, longevity, time to first reproduction, sociability) can be understood in terms of 
trade-offs in the allocation of resources to competing life functions such as maintenance, 
growth, and reproduction. The accumulated set of resource allocation decisions during life 
constitutes the individual’s life history strategy, which leads to the development of an 
integrated collection of life history traits. The most common approach to life history 
strategies poses a continuum from slow to fast (Promislow & Harvey, 1990). Leading models 
based on Life History Theory rely on this slow-to-fast approach to predict variation of traits 
and strategies both between and within species. In this vein, unpredictable and harsh 
environments are particularly related to the development of fast life history strategies that 
divert resources from long-term outcomes in favor of short-term outcomes, while predictable 
and secure settings lead to strategies in the opposite, slow end of the continuum (Kaplan & 
Gangestad, 2005). 
Life history strategies are often seen as species-distinctive characteristics but humans (as well 
as other organisms) have evolved mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity that allow them to 
adjust life history strategies to match local conditions during their lifetime (Belsky et al., 
1991; Brumbach et al., 2009; Ellis, 2004; McCullough et al., 2013; Nettle et al., 2010, 2011; 
Worthman, 2003). These strategies would lead to the maximization of individuals’ average 
lifetime inclusive fitness (Del Giudice et al., 2015; Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005; Roff, 1993). 
However, it is worth noting that existing theories are almost entirely based on verbal models, 
or on formal models designed to study the evolution of variation in life history strategies 
between species/populations, which tend to ignore the plasticity in life history strategies 
within species/populations.1 Few formal models to date have examined how suits of traits 
(e.g., onset of puberty, number of offspring, investment per offspring) should covary as a 
result of phenotypic plasticity (e.g., along a fast-slow continuum), depending on 
environmental conditions (Mathot & Frankenhuis, 2018). For pioneering verbal models of 
within-species/populations variation in life history traits along the fast-slow continuum, see 
Belsky et al. (1991), Ellis et al. (2009) and Reale et al. (2010). 
Yet, although the theoretical literature on life history clearly stresses the role of 
environmental conditions in shaping individuals’ DD, more research needs to be conducted 
to assess this link empirically. While a number of individual-level studies provide support 
for the hypothesized relationships by showing, for example, a connection between high DD 
and variables such as low income and education, which can be considered as proxies for 
unfavorable (potentially harsh and/or unpredictable) conditions (Becker & Mulligan, 1997; 
Chipman & Morrison, 2015; Green et al., 1996; Griskevicius et al., 2011; Kirby et al. 2002; 
Pender, 1996), few studies to date have examined to what extent the conditions of harshness 
and future-unpredictability faced by different groups can predict individual differences in 
DD. Given that those individual-level studies do not use grouping variables that are 
                                                 
1 We thank Reviewer 1 for pointing out this important issue. 
exogenous to the individual, they cannot put the focus on an environment-based analysis, as 
prevails in the theoretical literature. Ramos et al. (2013) is, to the best of our knowledge, the 
first study directly approaching the question. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, the 
authors show that slum-dwelling youth in Brazil (highly exposed to violence) discount future 
hypothetical rewards more heavily than university students from more affluent 
neighborhoods. A more recent study enlarged the number of comparison groups (46 countries 
were used as observation units) and found that country-level life expectancy can predict the 
average DD in a sample of university students from the country (Bulley & Pepper, 2017), 
also as hypothesized by a life history approach. Finally, Lee et al. (2018) extended the latter 
analysis to a larger sample from 54 countries using individual-specific life expectancy (i.e., 
age-, sex-, year-, and country-specific life expectancy), and show that the theoretical 
relationship holds especially when waiting is arguably more beneficial, that is, when the later-
larger reward is relatively high and delay is short. While these pieces of work have significant 
value, in the three cases, the authors compare groups of young individuals who, moreover, 
differ in a large number of uncontrolled characteristics that are not necessarily related to 
harsh and unpredictable living conditions but may influence DD. Among those are 
neighborhood facilities (which may translate into different access to services, for instance), 
geography, political regime, climate, and so forth. Furthermore, the tasks used to elicit the 
participants’ time preferences (i) did not allow for a parametrization of the individuals’ 
discount functions and (ii) were survey-based, without real incentives. In this paper we 
further contribute to fill this empirical gap.  
To test the predictions of the evolutionary framework of Life History Theory, this study 
explores the differences in DD between two populations which often face different socio-
ecological pressures even if they live in the same geographic areas, even in the same villages 
and neighborhoods. More specifically, using data from an economic experiment involving 
real monetary rewards, we compare the discounting behavior of a sample of Romani people 
from Southern Spain (Gitanos, or Calé, as they typically refer to themselves) with that of 
their non-Romani neighbors (i.e., the majority Spanish population).2 Technically speaking, 
we set up a quasi-experimental design where ethnicity is the only variable that a priori differs 
between treatment and control groups. Note that a pure experimental design cannot be 
applied here because the socio-ecological conditions under which the individuals develop, as 
proxied by their ethnicity, cannot be exogenously manipulated for obvious reasons. We 
consider that this design is as close to a controlled experiment as a study of these 
characteristics can be since ethnicity and its associated socio-ecological conditions are 
eminently exogenous, thus leaving little room for endogenous determination.  
The localities where we conducted our experiments are characterized by a particularly high 
concentration of Gitano people, amounting to over 25% of the total population, compared to 
1-1.5% in the whole of Spain (Gamella, 1996; Gamella et al., 2014). However, the Gitano 
population is clearly differentiated in their demographic and cultural profile, and faces a 
markedly different socio-economic “ecology” than the majority. Hence it constitutes a 
paradigmatic ethnic group for the goal of this study. Notwithstanding this, it is worth noting 
that theoretically identical opportunities (Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1992) in terms of access to public 
education, social benefits and healthcare, are provided (at least legally, on paper) to the 
Gitano population, at least since the advent of democracy in Spain, four decades ago.  
Compared to the dominant majority, the Gitano population of Spain is characterized by a 
lower socio-economic status (SES), including lower income and education, and also by 
                                                 
2 Spanish Gitanos have been barely studied using experimental economics methods. We are only aware of 
two studies: Brañas-Garza et al. (2006) explores how Gitanos play the Ultimatum Game, while Espín et al. 
(2018) analyzes punishment in the Public Goods Game.  
poorer health, lower life expectancy and higher fertility rates (Casals et al., 2011; Cook et al., 
2013; Gamella, 2011; Gamella et al., 2014; La Parra Casado et al., 2016; MSC-FSG, 2005). 
These processes have generated a differentiated demographic profile. For instance, in the 
study area, the Gitano population had a mean age of 27 years compared to the near 42 of the 
overall local population (Gamella, 2011). Life expectancy at birth has increased in this 
population almost continuously since the mid 1940s. But still today it seems to be from 5 to 
10 years below that of their non-Gitano neighbors (Gamella, 2011; MSC-FSG, 2005). This 
may have resulted in a different set of aggregated needs and outlooks. 
However, despite a long-lasting coexistence in many local areas, social exclusion, forced 
assimilation and discrimination by the majority have considerably influenced the lives of 
Gitanos as well as of other Romani groups in almost every part of the world (Matras, 2015). 
In Spain this still affects the lives of Gitano people, particularly in the most segregated areas. 
Several distinctive features of Gitano social life seem to reflect adaptations to these negative 
environmental and historical conditions. For instance, Gitanos maintain a strong and 
oppositional sense of identity and high levels of ethnic and familial endogamy. In the study 
area the Gitano minority presented rates of inbreeding five to eight times larger than those of 
the general population, and have maintained these until the present (Gamella & Martín, 2007; 
Martín & Gamella, 2005; Núñez Negrillo, 2016). These endogamous strategies tend to 
increase their social and perhaps their genetic homogeneity (Bittles, 2012). However they 
also might work as a protection against external threats associated with the discriminatory 
environments that Gitano confronted as a group (Fraser, 1995; Gamella et al., 2013; Matras, 
2015). Interestingly, the rate of incarceration of Gitanos is still nowadays much higher than 
that of the majority population. As an example, in a number of recent studies, Gitano women 
accounted for over 25% of the female prison population, a huge over-representation (Cerezo, 
2016; Feintuch, 2013). 
In addition, most Gitano groups, as other Romani groups through Europe, also maintain 
patterns of early and pronatalist marriage. Gitano women in the study area were found to 
have a mean age of first childbirth of 18-19 years (over a decade earlier than the Spanish 
average), and total fertility rates that doubled and even tripled those of the Spanish population 
at large (Gamella, 2011; Martín & Gamella, 2005). Infant mortality rates displayed by 
Gitanos have declined sharply during the last 60 years but are still nowadays considerably 
larger (about 40%) than those observed in the non-Gitano population (Gamella & Martín, 
2017; Martín & Gamella, 2005; MSC-FSG, 2005).  
These patterns of Gitanos can be understood as life history strategies situated at the 
(relatively) fast end of the fast-slow continuum, which are typically adopted by people who 
grow up in unpredictable and harsh environments (Brumbach et al., 2009; Dickins et al., 
2012; Frankenhuis et al., 2016; Johns et al., 2011). When the future is uncertain or 
predictably harsh (Bulley et al., 2017; McGuire & Kable, 2013), therefore, the appropriate 
response might be to develop a short time horizon (Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Daly & Wilson, 
2005; Pepper & Nettle, 2017) and to adopt strategies such as giving birth, as soon as possible, 
to the maximum number of offspring (Dickins et al., 2012; Johns et al., 2011; Nettle et al., 
2011; Worthman, 2003). In these ecologies, long-term resource allocation may not pay off 
because there is uncertainty (i.e. the distribution of outcomes has unknown properties such 
as the mean or SD due to random variation) that the organism will live until late adulthood. 
Although environmental harshness (risk of mortality-morbidity) and unpredictability 
(stochastic variation in salient environmental conditions which prevents ex-ante accurate 
predictions due to factors such as a lack of information or excessive complexity) are 
theoretically and empirically dissociable and may have differential effects on several life 
history traits (Belsky et al., 2012; Brumbach et al., 2009; Ellis et al., 2009), an orientation to 
the short-run is by definition predicted by both factors (Ellis et al., 2009; Frankenhuis et al., 
2016; Roff, 1993). In addition, the evidence suggests that the effects of environmental 
harshness and unpredictability on life history strategies are additive, not interactive 
(Brumbach et al., 2009). We further expand on this point in the Discussion section. 
In this vein, the aforementioned models based on Life History Theory predict that Gitanos 
will tend to display higher DD rates than their non-Romani neighbors, due to the different 
ecologies faced. Moreover, it is expected that individual socio-economic factors such as 
current (at adult age) education and income account for some but not all of the difference 
because life-history-related behavioral traits such as temporal orientation are thought to be 
mainly shaped in earlier stages of development (e.g., Belsky et al., 1991; Griskevicius et al., 
2011; McCullough et al., 2013; Mell et al., 2018). Group differences should indeed explain 
a large share of the individual differences, given the shared environmental influences during 
development within each group. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Protocol and participants 
Five lab-in-the-field experimental sessions were conducted in five similar semi-rural towns 
in Southern Spain (see Espín et al. 2012 for more details). From a total of 160 participants, 
nine were excluded from the analyses due to missing information in some of the key variables 
of this study. The final sample thus consists of 151 participants (63.6% females). Among 
these, 64 are (self-)identified as Gitanos, whereas 87 belong to the majority, non-Romani 
population. Average age in our sample was 46.8 (range 17-82) years old. All the socio-
demographic data were gathered in a post-experimental face-to-face interview, where age 
and years of schooling were obtained as continuous variables, while bins were used for 
income information (“no income (0€)”, “less than 500€”, “500€ or more but less than 1000€”, 
and so on; see Table 1).  
We did not ask participants directly about their ethnicity. Instead we took advantage of 
researchers with extensive experience in the field to help us identify potential participants 
from both ethnic affiliations. In these villages, ethnicity is common knowledge and often 
verbalized – as was confirmed during the post-experimental interviews. 
We have reported all the measures obtained and the experimental conditions that are relevant 
to the current study. Data exclusions are reported and justified below. The initial sample size 
(160 observations) was identical to Ramos et al. (2013) and allows us to obtain moderate 
differences (effect size, d=0.45) between the two groups with 80% power and α=0.05, 
accounting for representativeness in the relative sample sizes of the two groups (i.e., Gitanos 
represent between 1/5 and 2/5 of the towns’ population). 
Our procedure excluded two Gitanos from the sample for having missing income information 
and seven non-Gitanos, three for missing education achievement and four for missing income 
information. Except for three cases (one Gitano and two non-Gitanos) in which the 
participant did not know, or did not want to report, the income information, all missing values 
arise from interviewer’s mistakes (failing to ask one of the questions). The later means that 
missing values can be considered random so that excluding those nine observations should 
not produce distortions. An alternative method based on the imputation of missing values to 
the sample average yields qualitatively similar results (see Text S3 in the Supplementary 
Materials). 
The experimental sessions consisted of 32 participants each. The setting was nearly identical 
in each of the five towns. The Town Hall provided us with a large room, where we set up the 
“artefactual” lab consisting of a whiteboard, and 32 chairs and desks. Figure 1 shows one of 
the five assembled labs. As shown in Figure 1, cardboards were used to prevent visual contact 
between participants in order to ensure private decisions. Three of the authors plus a group 
of four assistants supervised all the sessions. The instructions were read aloud always by the 
same experienced researcher (see Text S1 in the Supplementary Materials).  
 
 
Figure 1. Representative “artefactual” lab. Location: Deifontes, Granada. 
 
 
2.2. Delay discounting task and measures  
To measure the participants’ DD, we employed a multiple-price-list task (Harrison et al., 
2002) with a one-month front-end delay (Espín et al., 2012). Using a decision sheet (see 
Figure S1 in the Supplementary Materials), the task consisted of 20 decisions in which the 
participant had to choose between receiving €150 in one month time and receiving a higher 
amount (increasing from €151.50 to €225 across decisions) in seven months time by marking 
the preferred option with a cross. These increasing amounts to be received after seven months 
were also presented in terms of simple interest rates. The lowest amount in the seven-month 
option (i.e., €151.50) added €1.50 to the €150 of the one-month option, which entails an 
increase of 1% in six months, that is, an annual simple interest rate of 2%. The highest amount 
in the seven-month option (i.e., €225) added €75 to the €150 of the one-month option, which 
entails an increase of 50% in six months, that is, an annual simple interest rate of 100%. All 
participants were presented with same decisions in the same (ascending) order. The fact that 
both the sooner-smaller and the later-larger reward were delayed, so that there was no “today” 
option, allows capturing long-term discounting behavior and alleviates the effect of distrust 
(about the experimenters actually coming back to the town to pay participants) on decisions. 
However, as detailed in the Discussion section, the use of this type of task entails some 
limitations that might influence our results. 
In every session, one participant was randomly chosen to receive the real payment (on the 
specific date) associated with the participant’s choice in one randomly-selected decision. 
Please refer to the Supplementary Materials (Text S1) for a more detailed explanation of the 
experimental procedure. 
 
2.3. Delay discounting measures.  
In the literature on DD there is considerable debate over which particular functional form 
better characterizes individuals’ discounting (Andersen et al., 2014; Frederick et al., 2002). 
The most common measures of DD are based on either exponential (constant-discounting) 
or hyperbolic (decreasing-discounting) functional forms. For robustness, we test our 
hypothesis using both characterizations. In particular, we obtained a discounting parameter 
K for each individual using the following equations:    
• For the hyperbolic functional form (henceforth Hyper-K) 
𝑉𝑑 =
𝑉𝑢
(1 + 𝐾𝑑)
 
• For the exponential functional form (henceforth Exp-K) 
𝑉𝑑  =  𝑉𝑢𝑒
−𝐾𝑑 
Where Vd stands for the reward’s discounted subjective value, Vu refers to its undiscounted 
value and d is the delay until its receipt (in years). The K parameter is derived from equalizing 
the discounted value of the sooner-smaller reward to that of the later-larger reward at the 
individual’s indifference point between both rewards (see next subsection for an explanation 
of the different indifference points considered in the different analyses). The higher the K, 
the more heavily future rewards are discounted and thus the more short-run oriented the 
individual is.  
The stability and external validity of DD measures have been evaluated in a number of 
previous studies. The test-retest stability of discount rates has been found to be in the range 
that is typically obtained for personality traits (Anokhin et al., 2015; Kirby, 2009; Ohmura et 
al., 2006). While some null results exist (e.g., Eisenstein et al., 2015; Mejía-Cruz et al., 2016; 
Stojek et al., 2014), evidence abounds that supports the validity of DD measures to predict 
behaviors with future consequences, such as addictions and drug consumption (Baker et al., 
2003; Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Yi et al., 2010), physical activity and obesity/overweight 
(Chabris et al., 2008; Reimers et al., 2009; Weller et al., 2008), and savings and loan use 
(Meier & Sprenger, 2010, 2012; Sutter et al., 2013). 
 
2.4. Statistical analysis 
We first report descriptive statistics for all the variables analyzed, separately for the Gitano 
and majority samples, in Table 1. Zero-order Spearman’s correlations between all the 
variables are presented in Table 2. Since the variables used in these initial analyses are 
categorical and/or arguably not normally distributed, parametric methods such as t-test or 
Pearson’s correlation are not justified, and thus we stick to non-parametric analysis. Although 
for some secondary analyses other approaches such as Fisher’s exact or Mann-Whitney tests 
tend to be more suitable, in the main text we report only correlations (Table 2) for the sake 
of brevity and, when appropriate, refer to the p-values from those other tests, which are 
developed in more detail in Text S2 in the Supplementary Materials.  
In Figure 2, we visually compare the DD of Gitanos with that of the majority employing 
different approaches (comparing cumulative distribution functions and subgroups in terms 
of age and income). For all these analyses, we consider that the smallest amount at which an 
individual is willing to wait the six months longer (i.e., seven months instead of one) 
represents her indifference point between the sooner-smaller and the later-larger reward (as 
in Espín et al., 2012).  
For the second and main analysis, we estimated individuals’ K parameters using interval 
regressions (Harrison et al., 2002). In this set of regressions, the indifference point of an 
individual is estimated to be in the interval between the later-larger amount offered in the 
decision immediately before the individual switched from the sooner-smaller to the later-
larger reward and that offered in the switching decision (for those individuals who never 
switched, the interval is assumed to be open; note that participants were specifically 
instructed not to follow multiple-switching, inconsistent patterns, as explained in more detail 
in Text S1). The interval regression method, thus, does not force us to assume an arbitrary, 
fixed indifference point (for instance, at the midpoint or the upper/lower bound) within each 
interval since it is instead estimated from the participants’ choices. This exercise cannot be 
done with other estimation methods such as ANOVA, OLS or Tobit. The regression analysis 
also allows us to control for key individual variables which could mediate a potential 
difference in DD between Gitanos and the majority. 
All the analyses were conducted using Stata v12 (StataCorp, Texas, USA). Unless otherwise 
stated, reported p-values were calculated from two-tailed tests.  
 
2.5. Data availability 
The data and code associated with this research are available at [link]. 
 
3. Results 
Regarding demographic differences between the Gitano and majority samples, the former 
were younger and more likely to be males (see Table 1; both ps<0.03 according to Mann-
Whitney and Fisher’s exact test, respectively, Text S2). For current SES, we observe that 
Gitanos were less likely to have a regular monthly income source, and reported a lower 
monthly income (both own income and other household’s income) and a lower number of 
years of schooling, compared to the majority (all ps<0.01, see Table 1 and Text S2). These 
differences are an indication of the representativeness of our Gitano and majority samples 
but also reflect the necessity of controlling for these variables in a regression analysis. 
In panel A of Figure 2, a stochastic dominance approach is used to compare the responses of 
the two ethnic groups in the DD task. In panels B and C, respectively, we display the mean 
Hyper-K and Exp-K of the two groups for each age tercile (note that we split age into terciles 
for visual clarity in the figure as it is the minimal split to observe potential non-linear 
relationships; all statistical analyses were performed using age as a continuous variable, 
though). Finally, in panels D and E, we perform the same comparison but now the sample is 
split into below-median and above-median total household income (given by the combination 
of own income and other household’s income). 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of DD between the Gitano and the majority samples. Stochastic 
dominance analysis (panel A); mean Hyper-K and Exp-K for each age tercile (panels B and 
C); mean Hyper-K and Exp-K for below- and above-median total household income (panels 
D and E). 
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We observe that, on average, Gitanos discount the future more heavily than the majority 
(mean differences of 0.272 and 0.181 for Hyper-K and Exp-K, respectively; see Table 1). For 
both characterizations of K, the raw (without controls) difference between Gitanos and the 
majority is significant according to Mann-Whitney test (p<0.01, Text S2) and interval 
regression (ps<0.01, Table 3, model 1). Similarly, as shown in panel A of Figure 2, the DD 
of the majority is stochastically dominated by that of Gitanos. More specifically, strict 
dominance is observed for all values (number of sooner-smaller choices) higher than two. 
From Figure 2A we can also see that our DD measure is strongly right-censored, especially 
for Gitanos (48% and 21% of the Gitano and majority individuals, respectively, chose the 
sooner-smaller option in every decision), which implies that reported differences will tend to 
underestimate the true underlying effect. 
However, as mentioned, Gitanos differ from the majority according to all the variables which 
will serve as individual-level controls. More importantly, some of these variables are also 
correlated with DD, in particular those used as proxies for current SES: income (both one’s 
own and household’s income) and years of schooling are negatively related with DD, 
although in some cases the correlation is only marginally significant (ps<0.07, Table 2). 
Therefore, the aforementioned ethnic differences in DD might actually be driven by 
individual socio-economic factors. 
After controlling for these potential individual-level confounds, however, Gitanos still 
display higher discount rates than the majority according to both DD characterizations 
(ps<0.03, models 2-4 in Table 3; see also panels B-E in Figure 2). Comparing model 1 with 
models 2-4 in Table 3, we observe that the addition of control variables does not substantially 
reduce the coefficient of ethnicity. Furthermore, among the control variables, only the highest 
category of own income (€2000-€3000) remains significant or marginally significant when 
ethnicity is taken into account (ps<0.06); although as can be seen in Table 1 there are no 
Gitanos in this category, so this result is arguably trivial. Both education and household’s 
income become non-significant (ps>0.40). Thus, it is the group-level differences that appear 
to explain a large portion of the individual-level differences, not the opposite. While our 
interval regressions do not allow us to compare the partial variance explained by each 
explanatory variable, an approximation using hierarchical OLS regressions (assuming known 
indifference points as for the previous secondary analyses, see the Statistical Analysis 
section) yields useful insights. On the one hand, if entered first, ethnicity explains 9.8% and 
9.1% of the variance of Hyper-K and Exp-K, respectively (both ps<0.01), and adding current 
SES (income and education variables) increases R2 by 2.6% and 2.8%, respectively. The 
explanatory power added by current SES is non-significant, however (both ps>0.33). On the 
other hand, if entered first, current SES explains 7.7% and 7.6% of the variance of Hyper-K 
and Exp-K, respectively (both ps<0.01), and adding ethnicity increases R2 by 4.7% and 4.3%, 
respectively. The explanatory power added by ethnicity is significant (both ps<0.01).  
Finally, another prediction of an adaptationist approach to DD is that age will show a U-
shaped relationship with K: both young and old individuals must discount the future more 
heavily than middle-aged individuals (Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Read & Read, 2004) 
because external hazards are perceived to be higher at younger ages (i.e., young people do 
not yet know if their world is risky or safe) whereas the true risk of death increases with age 
(Sozou & Seymour, 2003). We indeed observe a slight U-shaped relationship between age 
and K, in particular among Gitanos (see panels B and C in Figure 2), with a minimum K at 
about 44 yr. according to the regression estimates (see models 2-4 in Table 3), similarly to 
(Read & Read, 2004). Yet, the coefficients of age and age squared would become only close 
to significance even using one-tailed hypothesis testing (which is justified if the U-shape 
hypothesis is considered directional; ps<0.20 and ps<0.10 for two- and one-tailed tests, 
respectively). 
 
4. Discussion 
These results contribute to the scarce empirical literature on group-level differences in 
discounting behavior. Our data supports the adaptationist arguments of leading models built 
upon Life History Theory (e.g., Ellis et al., 2009; Frankenhuis et al., 2016; Kaplan & 
Gangestad, 2005). That is, participants from the ethnic group which faces harsher and more 
unpredictable ecological conditions discount the future more heavily even after controlling 
for the individuals’ current SES. Those adaptationist arguments applied to our results would 
entail that Gitanos discount the future heavily due to environmental uncontrollable factors 
which turn a preference for the present to be contextually appropriate, at least at the 
developmental time when this trait is established. Moreover, current SES loses nearly all its 
explanatory power once ethnicity is taken into account (although it is true that our current 
SES measures could not cover the whole spectrum of SES-related variables and there might 
be not enough variability, especially among Gitanos). This may ultimately imply that some 
fraction of the previously-reported relationship between socio-economic variables and DD 
(Harrison et al., 2002; Kirby et al., 2002; Read & Read, 2004; Tanaka et al., 2010) could be 
driven by unobserved factors related to the ecological conditions under which individuals 
developed, rather than by the individuals’ current SES. 
Recent research shows that individuals from small-scale societies with immediate-return 
systems display higher DD rates than individuals from agricultural societies in which 
resource accumulation is more pervasive (Salali & Migliano, 2015). The authors argue that 
in egalitarian immediate-return economic systems, discounting the future may be a group-
level adaptive strategy to the extent that it prevents resource accumulation and, consequently, 
the formation of hierarchies which could threat within-group equality (Salali & Migliano, 
2015; Woodburn, 1982). More research is required, however, to determine whether the 
existence of group-level selective pressures is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of 
this kind of inter-group behavioral differences. 
In sum, further empirical research should systematically assess the extent to which inter-
individual differences in DD can be better characterized as inter-group differences. Ours is 
only a first step in this direction which must be complemented with data from a larger number 
of ethnic groups before being able to draw firmer conclusions. The study of only two ethnic 
groups which differ in a number of current and historical ecological factors (such as life 
expectancy, health and socio-economic status, discrimination and persecution rates) prevents 
a systematic dissection of the partial effects of each one of these group-level differences on 
DD. A recent study using survey data from more than 40 countries finds that the proportion 
of “impatient citizens” (i.e., those who chose the sooner-smaller reward in a single 
hypothetical survey question) in a country is negatively related to the country’s average life 
expectancy (this result has been replicated by Lee et al. 2018 using a different approach), and 
that adding life expectancy to the equation eliminates the negative country-level relationship 
between impatience and age at first birth (Bulley & Pepper, 2017). The latter results, although 
not directly addressing causality due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, suggest that it 
is environmental mortality cues (as proxied by life expectancy) that influence both short-run 
orientation and early-reproduction decisions. 
With the present data, causality cannot be assessed either and many questions remain 
unanswered. For instance, future research should try to elucidate which part of the inter-
ethnic differences in DD might be understood as reflecting group-level (culturally 
transmitted) adaptations rather than individual-level adaptations to group-level conditions 
(Cavalli-Sforza, & Feldman, 1981; Lumsden & Wilson, 1981; McElreath et al., 2003). Life 
history traits may be acquired through cultural transmission (Boyd & Richerson, 1988; 
Lumsden & Wilson, 1981). In our case, the historical common experience of discrimination 
and persecution of the Gitano population, which are nowadays much reduced as compared 
to past centuries, is an obvious candidate to represent a cultural influence on the Gitanos’ 
discounting behavior. Only the study of a larger number ethnic groups with varying group-
level differences (in terms of both current and historical socio-ecological conditions), 
however, can effectively tackle this question. Yet, such an exercise would unavoidably lead 
to loss of experimental control since the inclusion of a larger number of ethnic groups, to the 
extent that they do not live in the exact same place, implies that many confounding factors 
are at play, such as geography, natural resource availability, weather, and political regime. 
Finally, our method to measure DD imposes several limitations that merit consideration. 
Although we focus on the differences between groups rather than on the exact estimated 
discount rates of participants, with the type of DD task we use, the elicited discount rates 
may be confounded by a series of factors. First, note that if Gitanos were less able than the 
majority to access and exploit the capital market (which seems reasonable), this might 
translate into higher estimated discount rates which are not related to pure time preference 
but to the (im)possibility of intertemporal arbitrage (Frederick et al, 2002). Although we 
consider that the relatively small monetary rewards offered in the task are not treated by 
subjects as susceptible for market arbitrage, and we also control for a number of income-
related variables, whether this factor can explain part of the difference between Gitanos and 
the majority is an interesting endeavor for future research. Second, another possible confound 
relates to the concavity of the utility function. Our method assumes that individuals’ utility 
functions are approximately linear over the range of stakes involved (this is common in the 
experimental literature on DD). However, a more concave utility function can be confounded 
with a higher discount rate (Andersen et al., 2008; Frederick et al, 2002; Lopez-Guzman et 
al., 2018). In this vein, our results could also be partially explained if Gitanos have a more 
concave utility function compared to the majority. Yet, this would mean that Gitanos are 
more risk averse since individual risk aversion is measured by the concavity of the utility 
function. Such an argument, while possible, is difficult to sustain given the evidence 
reviewed earlier (for instance, on incarceration rates).  
Third, the preference for sooner-smaller rewards over later-larger ones might be due to 
uncertainty about the future (Frederick et al, 2002). If any subject feels that the later reward 
will probably not be delivered then she can take the sooner reward in order to avoid the 
uncertainty. Therefore, she may appear as impatient while she is not. To alleviate this 
concern, we used a front-end delay methodology (Harrison et al., 2002) in which both the 
sooner and the later reward are delayed: the sooner reward is delayed by one month and the 
later by seven months. Hence, if there is uncertainty/distrust about future payments then both 
choices will be equally dubious. Note that if the sooner payment is immediate (instead of 
delayed) – as e.g. in Anokhin et al. (2011), Barkley et al. (2001), Dombrovski et al. (2011), 
Kirby et al. (2002) – then the respondent may choose it to reduce uncertainty instead of due 
to pure time preferences. Therefore our results might be explained by uncertainty only if 
Gitanos perceive the future (not the delayed payments in the task per se) as more uncertain 
than the majority. This is exactly what our paper argues: since the environment of Gitanos is 
harsher and the future is more uncertain for them, they are more focused on the short-run 
than the majority.  
Fourth, a higher expectation of future inflation may lead an individual to prefer sooner-
smaller rewards without the influence of time preference, simply because the money is worth 
less in the future (Frederick et al, 2002). If this confound explains part of our results, it would 
mean that Gitanos expect higher inflation than non-Gitanos. In principle, we consider this to 
be counterintuitive since Gitanos should instead be potentially assumed to care less about the 
possibility of inflation due to their poorer knowledge of economic dynamics – i.e. they should 
be more, not less, affected by “money illusion”. Even assuming that Gitanos expect higher 
inflation than non-Gitanos (due to any unobserved differential experience they might have), 
it is worth noting that the DD differences between the two groups are remarkable. To explain 
the current results in absence of time preferences, Gitanos should expect a differential 
inflation >25% than the majority. However, the maximum inflation rate that Spain has 
experienced in the last 30 years was about 7%, with an average of about 3%. Thus, it sounds 
sensible to conclude that different expectations of inflation do not crucially drive our results.  
Fifth, if someone believes she will be richer in the future, she might associate a lower relative 
value to the future rewards – and thus look as more impatient - without any true effect of 
time preference (Frederick et al, 2002). Applied to our results, this would mean that Gitanos 
expect to be relatively richer in seven months (vs. one month) compared to non-Gitanos. In 
order to test the validity of this concern, we compared the DD of the two groups only for 
those individuals who have a regular monthly income source. People with regular income are 
expected to exhibit more homogeneous beliefs about their future wealth than those 
individuals with irregular income sources. Thus, if this confound is partially driving our 
results, we would expect that the DD differences between the two groups would be reduced 
for the subsample of subjects with regular income. However, among those with regular 
monthly income (n=58), the difference in estimated exponential discount rate between 
Gitanos and the majority is about 0.50 (p<0.01; controlling for demographic variables) while 
among those with more irregular incomes (n=93) the difference is about 0.30 (p<0.02). 
Therefore, we conclude that this result does not support the hypothesis of expectations of 
changing utility. In any case, please note that the gap between the two options is only 6 
months, short enough to avoid large changes in expected wealth. 
In sum, our results suggest that discounting the future heavily might be a contextually 
appropriate response under the environmental conditions faced by Gitanos. A preference for 
the short-run could thus be developed as an adaptive response to uncertain and harsh 
ecologies, which talks against the view of impatience as dysfunctional, even if it may yield 
undesirable outcomes such as drug consumption and other unhealthy behaviors. The latter, 
however, opens the door for reverse or bi-directional causality in the sense that high DD may 
trigger morbidity and lower life expectancy. One potential source of reverse causality is 
genetics: if DD is heritable (Anokhin et al., 2011, 2015; Aycinena & Rentschler, 2017; 
Bevilacqua & Goldman, 2013), a negative relationship between life expectancy and 
impatience (Bulley & Pepper, 2017; Lee et al., 2018), for instance, might be led by genetic 
variation rather than life history calibrations (see Zietsch, 2016 for a discussion).3 Regarding 
the current results, it might seem plausible that genetic differences between Gitanos and non-
Gitanos help explain the DD differences. Since inbreeding and endogamy should have 
increased genetic homogeneity/isolation among Gitanos (Cavalli-Sforza et al., 2004; 
Kalaydjieva et al. 2001, 2005), it follows that if genetic variation drives behavioral variation, 
Gitanos’ DD should display lower variance than that of the majority. Yet, variance tests 
cannot reject the hypothesis that behavioral heterogeneity is the same in the two groups. 
Indeed, even if Gitanos exhibit slightly lower variance in DD (0.40 vs. 0.42 for Hyper-K and 
                                                 
3 We thank Reviewer 2 for suggesting us this discussion. 
0.27 vs. 0.29 for Exp-K), the difference is largely insignificant (both ps>0.55, two-tailed). 
Moreover, recall that Gitanos were more likely to choose the sooner-smaller reward in every 
decision (48% and 21% of the Gitano and majority individuals, respectively, chose the 
sooner-smaller option in every decision; see Figure 2A). This fact, arising from the task 
design, arguably increases the relative behavioral homogeneity among Gitanos artificially. 
The same variance tests conducted excluding those individuals still do not yield significance 
but show that variation is even slightly higher among Gitanos (0.38 vs. 0.34 for Hyper-K and 
0.27 vs. 0.25 for Exp-K; both ps>0.44). These results, therefore, do not favor a gene-based 
explanation of the between-groups DD differences. 
Further research should systematically unpack the relative influences that each one of the 
specific environmental factors defining individuals’ living ecologies have on discounting 
behavior. In particular, our data indicate that the formation of individuals’ time preferences 
might be importantly shaped by group-level social factors such as discrimination and 
segregation through their direct impact on environmental harshness and unpredictability. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the Gitano and majority samples  
  Gitanos Majority 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Hyper-K 64 0.912 0.397 0.020 1.211 87 0.640 0.419 0.020 1.211 
Exp-K 64 0.682 0.273 0.020 0.877 87 0.501 0.293 0.020 0.877 
Gender (male) 64 0.469 0.503 0 1 87 0.287 0.455 0 1 
Age 64 38.860 14.799 17 73 87 53.276 19.027 17 82 
Regular income 64 0.250 0.436 0 1 87 0.483 0.503 0 1 
Own income            
€0 64 0.297 0.460 0 1 87 0.322 0.469 0 1 
(€0, €500) 64 0.516 0.504 0 1 87 0.126 0.334 0 1 
[€500, €1000) 64 0.156 0.366 0 1 87 0.437 0.499 0 1 
[€1000, €2000) 64 0.031 0.175 0 1 87 0.080 0.274 0 1 
[€2000, €3000) 64 0 0 0 0 87 0.034 0.184 0 1 
Other household’s income          
€0 64 0.391 0.492 0 1 87 0.322 0.469 0 1 
(€0, €500) 64 0.453 0.502 0 1 87 0.092 0.291 0 1 
[€500, €1000) 64 0.109 0.315 0 1 87 0.276 0.450 0 1 
[€1000, €2000) 64 0.047 0.213 0 1 87 0.172 0.380 0 1 
[€2000, €3000) 64 0 0 0 0 87 0.103 0.306 0 1 
≥€3000 64 0 0 0 0 87 0.034 0.184 0 1 
Years schooling 64 2.906 3.022 0 6 87 6.632 4.232 0 15 
           
Notes: Number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum value and maximum value for each of the 
variables used in the analyses, separately for the Gitano and majority samples. Note that the average educational 
level of our participants is rather low as compared to the country’s official statistics due to the facts that (i) the 
experiments were conducted in a semi-rural and low-income area, and (ii) that the participants were older than 
the average Spanish population (older adults are still nowadays less educated than younger ones in Spain, 
especially in rural and poor areas; see the strong negative correlation between age and years of schooling in 
Table 2).  
Table 2. Bivariate Zero-Order Correlations 
  DD 
Ethnicity 
(Gitano) 
Gender 
(male) 
Age 
Regular 
income 
Own 
income 
Other h’s 
income 
Ethnicity 
(Gitano) 
0.3172*** -      
0.0001 
 
  
     
Gender 
(male) 
0.0039 0.1863** -     
0.9625 0.0220  
      
Age -0.0868 -0.3838*** -0.0616 -    
0.2895 0.0000 0.4525  
     
Regular 
income 
-0.1118 -0.2365*** 0.2228*** 0.3314*** -   
0.1716 0.0035 0.0060 0.0000 
 
Own 
income 
-0.1602** -0.2161*** 0.2781*** 0.3222*** 0.6676*** -  
0.0494 0.0077 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000 
 
Other 
household’
s income 
-0.1581* -0.3082*** -0.1727** -0.2532*** -0.1306 -0.1799** - 
0.0524 0.0001 0.0339 0.0017 0.1100 0.0271 
 
Years 
Schooling 
-0.1506* -0.4194*** 0.0540 -0.3831*** 0.0387 0.0282 0.3282*** 
0.0649 0.0000 0.5103 0.0000 0.6373 0.7309 0.0000  
Notes: Spearman’s rho coefficients and p-values. Ethnicity, Gender and Regular income are dummy variables taking the value 
of one if the participant is Gitano, male and has a regular income source, respectively; zero otherwise. Own income and Other 
household’s income are coded as ordered discrete variables. Since these are rank-order correlations, the measure of DD here is 
merely given by the number of sooner-smaller choices in the task, which is independent from the functional form used to 
characterize DD. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, two-tailed.  
Table 3. Interval regression estimation of individuals’ DD (K) 
dep. var.: 
1a 
Hyper-K 
1b 
Exp-K 
2a 
Hyper-K 
2b 
Exp-K 
3a 
Hyper-K 
3b 
Exp-K 
4a 
Hyper-K 
4b 
Exp-K 
Ethnicity 
(Gitano) 
0.375*** 0.264*** 0.444*** 0.311*** 0.403*** 0.280*** 0.399** 0.277** 
(0.097) (0.069) (0.105) (0.075) (0.123) (0.087) (0.176) (0.125) 
Gender  
(male) 
  -0.091 -0.069 -0.037 -0.030 -0.041 -0.031 
  (0.104) (0.074) (0.106) (0.076) (0.122) (0.087) 
Age 
  -0.024 -0.017 -0.021 -0.016 -0.021 -0.015 
  (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) 
Age2 
  0.027 0.020 0.025 0.018 0.025 0.018 
  (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) 
Regular 
Income 
  
  0.034 0.023 0.023 0.016 
    (0.145) (0.104) (0.145) (0.104) 
o
w
n
 i
n
co
m
e 
(€0, 
€500) 
   
 -0.070 -0.051 -0.083 -0.059 
 
   (0.140) (0.099) (0.146) (0.103) 
[€500, 
€1000) 
 
 
  
-0.156 -0.114 -0.158 -0.116 
 
   
(0.163) (0.116) (0.163) (0.116) 
[€1000, 
€2000) 
 
 
  
-0.061 -0.038 -0.109 -0.073 
 
   (0.208) (0.147) (0.220) (0.155) 
[€2000, 
€3000) 
 
 
  
-0.634** -0.467** -0.625* -0.456* 
 
   (0.287) (0.213) (0.324) (0.240) 
o
th
er
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
’s
 i
n
co
m
e 
(€0, 
€500) 
  
    0.024 0.012 
  
    (0.138) (0.098) 
[€500, 
€1000) 
  
    -0.045 -0.036 
  
    (0.143) (0.102) 
[€1000, 
€2000) 
  
    -0.109 -0.075 
  
    (0.154) (0.109) 
[€2000, 
€3000) 
  
    -0.176 -0.131 
  
    (0.225) (0.160) 
≥€3000 
  
    -0.103 -0.078 
  
    (0.226) (0.159) 
Years 
schooling 
  
    0.012 0.008 
  
    (0.018) (0.013) 
Constant 
0.648*** 0.510*** 1.079*** 0.833*** 1.089*** 0.840*** 1.059** 0.824*** 
(0.058) (0.041) (0.324) (0.229) (0.314) (0.222) (0.431) (0.304) 
ln sigma 
Cons. -0.607*** -0.945*** -0.618*** -0.956*** -0.632*** -0.971*** -0.638*** -0.978*** 
 
(0.075) (0.077) (0.073) (0.075) (0.073) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075) 
chi2 14.910*** 14.516*** 19.180*** 18.757*** 28.613*** 27.437*** 34.569*** 34.463*** 
ll -395.167 -390.9827 -393.4772 -389.2568 -391.6776 -387.3093 -391.1013 -386.7487 
Pseudo-R2 0.094 0.091 0.114 0.112 0.135 0.134 0.141 0.141 
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Notes: Interval regression estimates. Model 1 tests the effect of ethnicity on DD without control variables. In model 2, 
demographic controls are included (Age2 refers to Age2/100). Whether the individual has a regular income source and the 
individual’s own monthly income (omitted category: €0) are also controlled for in model 3. Finally, model 4 also controls 
for other household’s income (omitted category: €0) and years of schooling. For each model specification, Hyper-K and Exp-
K are the dependent variable in column (a) and (b), respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Pseudo-R2 refers to 
Cox-Snell’s index. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, two-tailed. 
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socio-economic status” 
 
 
S1. The delay discounting task  
For the experiment, we used an adaptation of the intertemporal choice task used by 
Harrison et al. (2002; see main text). We decided to use a front-end delay procedure to 
capture long-term discounting behavior and minimize the effect of distrust (in terms of 
whether the experimenters will effectively come back to the town to pay participants) on 
individuals’ choices. To do this, we employed a task consisting of 20 categories ranging 
from 2% to 100% simple annual interest rate (r). The procedure was as follows. 
Four assistants delivered the delay discounting decision sheet to the participants 
(each session consisted of 32 individuals, always with the same instructor [PBG] 
conducting the experiments). As can be seen in Figure S1, the decision sheet contained a 
table with two main columns (options A and B) and 20 rows. In each row, option A offered 
€150 to be received one month after the experiment, while option B offered a higher 
amount to be received seven months after the experiment. In an extra column, the 
participants could see the interest rate associated with the six-month wait (that is, with 
choosing option B), which increases across rows from 2% to 100%. Thus, option B in the 
first row offered €151.50 (i.e. r = 0.02) and option B in the twentieth row offered €225 (r = 
1). The participants had to choose between option A and B in each of the 20 rows by 
marking with a cross on the corresponding column.  
In order to avoid mistakes and, more specifically, inconsistent choices – a frequent 
problem with multiple-price-list tasks, where multiple switching patterns are often 
observed, even among university students –, the instructor conducted the task row by row. 
Subjects were asked, scenario by scenario, to choose between A and B. Moreover, they 
were advised that once option B was reached they should stay at that point, given that once 
B has been already chosen it makes no sense to switch to option A again in the next row. 
Given the (expected) low educational level of a non-negligible proportion of our 
participants (see Table 1 in the main text), we believe that this systematic procedure 
importantly reduced the number of mistakes. Since inconsistent choices impede the 
estimation of an individual’s discount rate, we thus reduced a potentially high number of 
missing observations to zero. 
The participants were told that because of financial constraints only one, randomly 
selected individual per session would be paid for this part of the experiment. Once the 
decision sheets were collected, the “winner” and the “prize” (row) were randomly selected 
by picking numbered balls from an opaque bag in front of the participants. The average 
earnings of the five selected participants were €166.50. One member of the team [AME] 
phoned each of them in order to arrange a meeting for payment after one or seven months 
depending on the option chosen by the participant in the randomly selected row. This was 
common knowledge among participants when making their decisions. Since both options in 
the task were delayed (front-end delay), our design avoids the problem of different 
transaction costs between options – including different levels of trust in getting actually 
paid. 
 
Figure S1. Screenshot of the delay discounting decision sheet (translated from Spanish) 
 
  
 
S2. Robustness checks for secondary analyses 
In this section, we complement the statistical analysis reported in the main text 
based on Spearman correlations (Table 2). In particular, we check the robustness of those 
analyses which include at least one binary variable to more appropriate statistical tests (i.e. 
either Mann-Whitney test or Fisher’s exact test in the case of two binary variables; two-
tailed). 
According to Mann-Whitney test,  
• compared to a non-Gitano, the probability that a Gitano: chooses the sooner-smaller 
reward more often in the DD task is 68.2% (p<0.001); is older is 27.6% (p<0.001); 
reports a higher personal income is 37.9% (p=0.008); reports a higher (other) 
household’s income is 32.6% (p<0.001); reports a higher number of years of 
schooling is 27.1% (p<0.001).  
• compared to a female, the probability that a male: chooses the sooner-smaller 
reward more often in the DD task is 50.2% (p=0.962); is older is 46.3% (p=0.451); 
reports a higher personal income is 65.9% (p<0.001); reports a higher (other) 
household’s income is 40.0% (p=0.034); reports a higher number of years of 
schooling is 53.0% (p=0.509). 
• compared to someone without regular income, the probability that a participant with 
regular income: chooses the sooner-smaller reward more often in the DD task is 
43.5% (p=0.171); is older is 69.7% (p<0.001); reports a higher personal income is 
87.9% (p<0.001); reports a higher (other) household’s income is 42.5% (p=0.110); 
reports a higher number of years of schooling is 52.1% (p=0.636). 
 
According to Fisher’s exact test,  
• compared to non-Gitanos, Gitanos are 18.2% more likely to be male (46.9% vs. 
28.7%; p=0.027) and 23.3% less likely to report a regular income (25.0% vs. 
48.3%; p=0.004). 
• compared to females, males are 21.0% more likely to be Gitano (54.5% vs. 35.4%; 
p=0.027) and 22.5% more likely to report a regular income (52.7% vs. 30.2%; 
p=0.009). 
• compared to those without regular income, participants with regular income are 
24.0% less likely to be Gitano (27.6% vs. 51.6%; p=0.004) and 22.0% more likely 
to be male (50.0% vs. 28.0%; p=0.009) 
 
 
 
S3. Robustness checks for the treatment of missing values 
Table S1 replicates the set of regressions presented in Table 3 in the main text but 
replacing the nine missing values with the sample average of the variable in each case. 
 
  
Table S1. Interval regression estimation of individuals’ DD (K) without exclusions 
dep. var.: 
1a 
Hyper-K 
1b 
Exp-K 
2a 
Hyper-K 
2b 
Exp-K 
3a 
Hyper-K 
3b 
Exp-K 
4a 
Hyper-K 
4b 
Exp-K 
Ethnicity 
(Gitano) 
0.395*** 0.279*** 0.455*** 0.320*** 0.432*** 0.303*** 0.359** 0.250** 
(0.098) (0.070) (0.106) (0.076) (0.124) (0.088) (0.174) (0.124) 
Gender  
(male) 
  -0.092 -0.068 -0.039 -0.030 -0.036 -0.028 
  (0.103) (0.074) (0.107) (0.076) (0.121) (0.086) 
Age   
-0.027* -0.020* -0.022 -0.016 -0.023 -0.016 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) 
Age2   0.029* 0.021* 0.025 0.018 0.024 0.018 
  (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) 
Regular 
Income 
  
  0.080 0.058 0.072 0.053 
    
(0.141) (0.101) (0.141) (0.101) 
o
w
n
 i
n
co
m
e 
(€0, 
€500) 
   
 -0.141 -0.103 -0.165 -0.119 
 
   (0.143) (0.102) (0.148) (0.105) 
[€500, 
€1000) 
 
 
  
-0.213 -0.155 -0.222 -0.162 
 
   (0.161) (0.115) (0.160) (0.115) 
[€1000, 
€2000) 
 
 
  
-0.121 -0.080 -0.175 -0.120 
 
   
(0.205) (0.145) (0.219) (0.155) 
[€2000, 
€3000) 
 
 
  -0.711** -0.523** -0.651** -0.477** 
 
   
(0.288) (0.214) (0.317) (0.235) 
o
th
er
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
’s
 i
n
co
m
e 
(€0, 
€500) 
  
    0.058 0.036 
  
    
(0.138) (0.098) 
[€500, 
€1000) 
  
    -0.064 -0.049 
  
    (0.144) (0.103) 
[€1000, 
€2000) 
  
    -0.172 -0.122 
  
    (0.154) (0.110) 
[€2000, 
€3000) 
  
    -0.237 -0.174 
  
    (0.225) (0.160) 
≥€3000 
  
    -0.197 -0.144 
  
    (0.220) (0.155) 
Years 
schooling 
  
    0.007 0.005 
  
    (0.018) (0.013) 
Constant 0.651*** 0.512*** 1.165*** 0.895*** 1.134*** 0.871*** 1.233*** 0.946*** 
(0.058) (0.041) (0.330) (0.238) (0.318) (0.225) (0.427) (0.301) 
ln sigma 
Cons. -0.581*** -0.917*** -0.592*** -0.928*** -0.607*** -0.944*** -0.616*** -0.954*** 
 (0.075) (0.077) (0.073) (0.075) (0.073) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075) 
chi2 16.28*** 15.85*** 20.34*** 19.89*** 30.13*** 28.84*** 37.85*** 37.77*** 
ll -413.482 -410.038 -411.638 -408.136 -409.395 -405.740 -408.366 -404.743 
Pseudo-R2 0.097 0.095 0.118 0.116 0.142 0.142 0.153 0.153 
N 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Notes: Interval regression estimates. Model 1 tests the effect of ethnicity on DD without control variables. In model 2, 
demographic controls are included (Age2 refers to Age2/100). Whether the individual has a regular income source and the 
individual’s own monthly income (omitted category: €0) are also controlled for in model 3. Finally, model 4 also controls 
for other household’s income (omitted category: €0) and years of schooling. For each model specification, Hyper-K and 
Exp-K are the dependent variable in column (a) and (b), respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Pseudo-R2 
refers to Cox-Snell’s index. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, two-tailed. 
  
 
